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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
THE EFFECT OF NON-USER IN PENNSYLVANIA
In the summer of 1949 there was a terrible drought in Podunk, Pa. AB, one
of the local farmers, was in desperate need of water for his cattle; so, remember-
ing that his grandfather had once mentioned having a right to use a trail which
crossed the land of one RP, AB moved his cattle over said trail and across said
land to the Kitchamoo River which lay on the other side. However, AB's supposi-
tion of the continuance of that right apparently boomeranged, because RP immedi-
ately proceeded to bring an action against AB in the local court. Now AB is in
court, pleading in the alternative;
First: That the right was secured to him by deed; or
Second: That the right was acquired by adverse possession for the statutory
period.
Assuming that there has been a lapse of 26 years since the right was last ex-
ercised, what decision should be forthcoming from the court upon AB's establish-
ing either plea? Or, to be more concise, what is the effect of non-user upon
1. An easement acquired by grant, or
2. An easement acquired by prescription
in Pennsylvania?
In the Restatement of Property may be found a general rule, apparently
covering the overall picture, to the effect that
"Non-user does not of itself produce an abandonment (of an easement)
no matter how long continued."'
But that rule is definitely general, applying to all easements, no matter how ac-
quired, and we shall soon see that the law in Pennsylvania does not in all respects
agree with it.
One of the earliest cases in Pennsylvania was that of Butz v. Ihrie,2 which
dealt with the effect of non-user upon a privilege acquired by way of reservation.
And, in keeping with our hypo, the period of non-user was longer than necessary
for prescription. The court there held that:
"Mere non-user for 32 years of a privilege to swell water on the land
of the grantee did not bar or forfeit the privilege reserved."
Then two years later the question again arose in Nitzell v. Paschalla and
again we find a right based upon a deed, but this time the non-user had continued
for a period of 38 years. Yet, the court reached the same conclusion. However, it
1 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 504 comment d (1944).
2 1 Rawle 218 (Pa. 1829).
3 3 Rawle 76 (Pa. 1831).
NOTES
is in this case that is found the beginning of a distinction which apparently exists
at the present time. Mr. Chief Justice Gibson, a most eminent jurist, delivered
the opinion in that case, and the following is quoted from him:
"I think that there cannot be a doubt that a lapse of time may be so
great as to afford a natural presumption (of the loss of a right), but
where it has been acquired by grant, it will not be lost by non-user, in
analogy to the statute of limitations, unless there were a denial of the title
or other act on the adverse party to quicken the owner in the assertion of
his right."
Had the Chief Justice stopped at this point, perhaps his dictum would have
passed unnoticed, but he did not. Continuing, he said:
"It is certainly true that a right of enjoyment may be lost in the same
way it has been gained, and when acquired by an adverse possession
for 20 years, it may, I should presume, be lost by non-user for the same
period."
As a result, we have three classes of cases in Pennsylvania concerning the
extinguishing of an easement by non-user:
1. Those in which it is emphatically held that non-user will not effect an
extinguishment of an easement acquired by deed or grant;
2. Those in which it is intimated that non-user might effect the extinguish-
ment of easements acquired by deed or prescription;
3. Those in which it is held that non-user will presumably effect the ex-
tinguishment of easements acquired through prescription.
First Class
In so far as the first class of cases is concerned, it might be noticed that they
all pertain to rights by way of deed, and therefore would be very little authority
where an easement by prescription is concerned. But it does not necessarily follow
that the rule which they set forth is not deserving of applicability in the prescrip-
tion cases.
Technically speaking, there is really no sound basis for a distinction between
easements created by grant and those created by prescription, if the fiction of
the early courts is followed. Under that doctrine, an easement by prescription was
presumed to rest upon a lost grant, or as Tiffany words it, "a lost deed."' And if
that were so, there really should be no differentiation between them. But the
courts were not content to stop there. Rather, they continued along their line of
fallacious reasoning and raised another fiction to lose the "lost deed" upon the
showing of non-user for 21 years. One of the early Supreme Court decisions of
this state attempted to call a spade a spade and exposed the fiction for what it
4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 544 (Abr. Ed. 1940).
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was worth. 5 But subsequent cases failed to take advantage of the opportunity to
strike one more incumbrance from the law and continued to cling hopelessly to
F doctrine which avails little more than nothing.6
However, on the other hand, the American Law Institute and the Restatement
of Property have quite frankly recognized the fiction for what it was worth when
they say that "the justification for permitting easements by prescription or the
acquisition of any interest in land by adverse occupancy rests upon the protection
given by the law to the one who used as against the one who suffered the use." 7
Yet, even this reasoning does not suffer us to unequivocally say that there should
continue to be a distinction.
There are many arguments which might be advanced on either side as to
whether the courts should continue to distinguish between easements by grant and
easements by prescription. Nor is it pertinent to this topic that the subject should
be undertaken completely or extensively. However, it might be well to mention
one or two of the more pertinent arguments which might be put forth.
Reasoning from an analogy to the acquisition of land by means of adverse
possession, it would seem strange that the one should be lost by non-user while
the other could never be lost in that manner. True, thLre is no essence of possession
or seisin in the instance of easements, but they are both of equal formality, and
are both founded upon the same principle. Thus, why should there be any differ-
tnce? Should the acquisition of a corporeal interest in land by adverse possession
be protected more fully than the acquisition of an incorporeal interest in land by
prescription?
Or again, should an easement by grant which has been spread on the record
be accorded a mor sacred position in the annals of property than the confirmation
of a prescriptive easement by judgment record?
On the other hand, it is very easy to understand that an estate free of an
incumbrance is much more desirable than a servient estate. And the courts will
generally follow through along that line, strictly construing any such incumbrances
so as to limit them as much as possible. But here again we run into a very sound
argument against the distinction. If such is the case, that it is desired that incum-
brances be avoided if at all possible, why not then steer clear of any distinction and
use the rule for both which may work the quickest avoidance?
However, suffice it to say that there is a distinction, and that there is no rea-
son to assume that it shall not continue for quite some time to come.
5 Okeson v. Patterson, 29 Pa. 22 (1857).
6 Mather-Klotk Inc. v. Plymire, 349 Pa. 194, 36 A.2d 802 (1944); Lehigh Valley Coal
Co. Appeal, 351 Pa. 108, 40 A.2d 399 (1945) ; Mecke v. Heist, 54 Mont. 27) (Pa.).
7 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 477 comment b (1944).
NOTES
In that field characterized by the existence of a deed, there is a wide and in-
clusive authority on the subject, in which might be found almost every imaginable
situation. But the sum and substance of all of these cases is that non-user is
immaterial, of no effect, or other such terminology. 8
For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Erb v. Brown9 that,
"A servitude by grant will not become 'xtinguished by disuse, unless
accompanied by Jenial or other act to quicken its owner to assert his
right. Such a servitude can only be extinguished by deed or note in writ-
ing or operation of law."
And the Superior Court held in one of its earliest decisions that,
"When a right of way is claimed by grant, such right cannot be ex-
tinguished by disuse or lost by non-user, unless there be a denial of title
or other act on the part of the adverse party to quicken the owner in the
assertion of his right, and an abandonment of a servitude created by
deed cannot be inferred from non-use by the grantee.' 1
Then again the Superior Court held in the Nickels case1 that,
"A right to the use of an alley, granted by deed, cannot be lost merely
by non-user. Nothing less than an absolute denial of the right followed
by an enjoyment inconsistent with its existence for the period of 21 years
or more can amount to an extinguishment of the right."
And then in the later case of Bombaugb v. Miller12 the situation was very
ably summed up by the court in its comment on the charge which the trial judge
had made to the jury.
There, an entry had been made upon a lane by D, whose title was acquired
by deed. He held the same continually for 21 years. P also had a right, acquired
by deed, to the use of that same lane, and D attempted to bar him from that use.
The court in its opinion said,
"To prove abandonment of a servitude created by deed, something
more must be done than to show that it was rarely exercisd by the
grantee, and where the P had not the exclusive but the concurrent use of
a lane, and his reserved right was spread on the record, and appeared in
D's chain of title, and the latter had other notice thereof, it was error to
instruct the jury that P was obliged to continuously use the grant to avoid
the presumption of its abandonment.'
8 St. Mary's Church v. Miles, I Wharton 229 (Pa. 1835) ; Hall v. McCaughey, 51 Pa. 43
(1865); Lindeman v. Lindsey, 69 Pa. 93 (1871); McKee v. Perchment, 69 Pa. 342 (1871); Rich.
mond v. Bennett, 205 Pa. 470, 55 A. 17 (1903); Citizen's Electric Company, Appint., v. Davis,
44 Pa. Super. 138 (1910); Haig Corp., Appint., v. Thomas S. Gassner Co., Inc., 163 Pa .Super.
611, 63 A.2d 433 (1949)-Most recent case. A right of way or easement, established by deed, is
not lost by non-user.
9 69 Pa. 216 (1871).
10 Twibill v. L. and S. S. Pass. Ry. Co. and Elec. Traction Co., Appnts., 3 Pa. Super. 487
(1897).
11 Nickels v. Hand in Hand Cornet Band, Applnt., 52 Pa. Super. 138 (1910).
12 82 Pa. 203 (1876).
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But any further citation of cases along this line is unnecessary, inasmuch as
they all follow the general rule.
Second Class
Under the second class of cases, which are few in number, we find in particu-
lar, the Nitzell case' 8 and Dyer v. Depui,14 which followed Chief Justice Gibson's
dictum by eight years. Perhaps the rule evolved in this case was influenced by that
dictum. It would seem so, since the language employed is almost identical. Parts
of the trial judge's charge are quoted.
" It is said in the first place that this right of the plaintiff under the
deed has been lost by neglecting to exercise it. A right may be lost in
this way, but it certainly cannot be so lost in a shorter period than a
right of this nature could be acquired by a reverse occupancy-viz., 21
years.
And further on he continues,
"The rule in Pennsylvania is that non-user of an incorporeal heredi-
tament for 21 years creates a presumption to defeat the right. Non-user
for 20 years is not sufficient."
It could be contended, without stretching the rule there cited, that this goes
beyond the Chief Justice's dictum, since it is inferred that the right involved,
though acquired by deed, could be affected by non-user. However, on appeal
these points were not considered by the court, the only reference being to the
statute of limitations under the Act of 1785,15 plaintiff contending that 20 years
was sufficient to raise the presumption.
Thus we are left in doubt as to the position the court might have taken at that
early date had error been assigned as to those parts of the charge. As a result, we
must fall back on the general rule as pertaining to easements acquired by deed.
Third Class
In th'e third class the authority is apparently limited to one case, that of Com-
monwealth v. Zimmerman.'6 And even it is not clearly in point with the desired
situation.
The facts were that one Abraham Z. was given the right to "fich wathar"
from a certain spring, the privilege being one in gross created by deed. The right
was exercised by the grantee, the water having been carried in buckets along a
path which led from A's place to the spring. Later, by virtue of a deed, Hiram Z.
came into possession of the land of A and while the land was in his possession,
about 23 years before this action, H laid a pipe from the spring to the said land.
But its use was abandoned about a year later, and thL pipe became choked up.
18 Supra.
14 5 Wharton 584 (Pa. 1839).
IS Act of March 26, 1785, 2 Sm. L. 299, 12 P. S. 72.
IG 56 Pa. Super. 311 (1914).
NOTES
Shortly prior to this action, H entered upon the alleged servient land, which was
posted, for the purpose of replacing that pipe with one of larger dimensions, and
the owner brought this action of trespass. However, the difficulty lies in the fact
that the circumstances surrounding the laying of the original pipe were not known.
It was not shown that the piping had been done with the acquiescence of the then
owner or adversely to his rights therein. Thus the fact that a prescriptive right
had been created was dubious, to say the least, and as a result, the court was in
a quandary as to the proper disposition of the case.
The final conclusion finds the court hesitating between easements in gross,
the right to replace the old pipe with a larger one, and the loss of easements ac-
quired by prescription through non-user, not knowing with certainty upon which
ground to sustain their decision of H's liability, but rather citing all three in an
attempt to hit upon the correct reasoning.
The opinion does, though, reaffirm, by dictum, the earlier dictum attributable
to Chief Justice Gibson that,
"A non-user of a prescriptive right for more than 21 years, under the
circumstances of this case, raises, we think, a presumption of abandon-
ment."
But that leaves us with less than nothing. Such assistance is as water to a
drowning man.
Thus we find that there are two situations:
1. That of an easement acquired by grant, upon which non-user has no effect
whatsoever as to the extinguishing of the right; and
2. That of an easement acquired by prescription, upon which non-user for
the period of 21 years will evidently, by virtue of the dictum rule, cause
a forfeiture;
with a number of cases in between, where the inference is unauthoritative, to say
the least.
Non-User as Evidence of Intention
But this does not wind up the problem. The question now arises as to whether
there is any benefit to be derived from showing non-user. The Restatement has
said that non-user "but evidences the necessary intention" of abandonment. 1" Is
this true?
As we have seen from the Zimmerman case,' 8 in the instance of easements
by prescription, a consideration of this is immaterial, assuming that the dictum
will be controlling in future cases. But what is the situation where the privilege
17 See note 1, supra.
18 Supra.
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was acquired by grant? The Pennsylvania cases, for the most part, have not con-
cerned themselves too much with this problem, since there has generally been
no necessity to do so. Yet there is one such case in this state which directly attempts
to discover a solution. In Weaver v. Glelz"9 the Superior Court affirms an opin-
ion which undertook to determine the weight to be given non-user as evidence of
abandonment. The court held that,
"The fact that another right of way than that acquired by deed was
used is no evidence of abandonment of the right of way acquired by
deed, in the absence of any proof that the owner of the land obstructed
such right of way."
However, this does not in truth offer a solution, unless it might be inferred
that the court had reference not only to abandonment, but also to the intention
to abandon. Something more is needed to throw light on the court's interpretation
of its own rule, and that it is believed, may be found in one of the cases cited there-
in with the high approval of the court. That case, Welsh v. Taylor,20 presents the
proposition that,
"A person who acquires title by deed to an easement appurtenant to
land has the same right of property therein as he has in the land, and it
is no more necessary that he should make use of it to maintain the title
than it is that he should actually occupy or cultivate the land; hence his
title is not affected by non-user, and, unless there is shown against him
some adverse possession or loss of title in some of the ways recognized
by law, he may rely on the existence of his property with full assurance
that, when the occasion arises for its use and enjoyment, he will find
his rights therein absolute and unimpaired .... Abandonment necessarily
implies non-user, but non-user does not create abandonment, no matter
how long it continues. There must be found in the facts and circum-
stances connected with non-user an intention on the part of the owner
of the easement to give it up, but intention 'existing coupled with non-user
will uphold a finding of abandonment."
It would be very strange indeed could one show abandonment and not be
able to show non-user, but it does not follow that non-user will be accorded weight
sufficient to show an intention to abandon. As is seen from the above citation,
something in addition is needed to uphold any finding of abandonment. And
conversely, can it be said that non-user is not necessary in order to prove abandon-
ment? It would seem that the affirmative answer to this question would be the
logical one.
Therefore, as a necessary conclusion to the above, we can safely say that
non-user as evidence of the intention to abandon is slight, if not closely approxi-
mating the degree of insignificance. Nevertheless, even the ant can move moun-
19 16 Pa. Super. 418 (1901).
20 134 N. Y. Rep. 450, 31 N. E. 896, 18 L. R. A. 535 (1893)-The later citation contains
a fine collection of cases in re the effect of non-user upon easements.
NOTES
tains, so a showing of non-user in many instances may mean the difference be-
tween a favorable and an unfavorable consequence.
In conclusion, as a sidenote to the foregoing, there is also another situation
of which mention might be made, namely, that of easements acquired by eminent
domain and the effect of non-user thereon.
For the most part, the rules governing these privileges and non-user are not
unlike those governing the acquisition of such rights by grant and non-user.
"An abandonment of land appropriated by a municipality for public
use cannot be established by proof merely of a failure for the time to
use it."21
However, in two situations statutes are applicable which change the rule to
some extent.
1. By the Act of 1893,22 which refers to easements created for the benefit
of mining concerns, there is a loss by non-user upon 21 years adverse
possession by the owner of the land, and
2. Likewise, by the Act of 1893,23 which refers to easements which have
been acquired by corporations under the right of eminent domain, the
vacation, cessation of occupation, and non-user of that right and privilege
for a period of 15 years will terminate it,
But these instances are mere exceptions, and will be rarely encountered, leav-
ing only the situation where the right is acquired by prescription as unsettled and
possibly conflicting with the general rule that "mere non-user will not effect an
extinguisbment or abandonment of an easement."
Roy Miller
21 Corr, Applnt., v. Philadelphia, 212 Pa. 123, 61 A. 808 (1905).
22 Act of May 26, 1893, P. L. 143, 68 P. S. 421.22.
28 Act of June 10, 1893, P. L. 415, 68 P. S. 423.
